Enhanced descriptions from Syndetics:

Why does reason matter, if (as many people seem to think) in the end everything comes down to blind faith or gut instinct? Why not just go with what you believe even if it contradicts the evidence? Why bother with rational explanation when name-calling, manipulation, and force are so much more effective in our current cultural and political landscape? Michael Lynch's In Praise of Reason offers a spirited defense of reason and rationality in an era of widespread skepticism -- when, for example, people reject scientific evidence about such matters as evolution, climate change, and vaccines when it doesn't jibe with their beliefs and opinions.

In recent years, skepticism about the practical value of reason has emerged even within the scientific academy. Many philosophers and psychologists claim that the reasons we give for our most deeply held views are often little more than rationalizations of our prior convictions. In Praise of Reason gives us a counterargument. Although skeptical questions about reason have a deep and interesting history, they can be answered. In particular, appeals to scientific principles of rationality are part of the essential common currency of any civil democratic society. The idea that everything is arbitrary -- that reason has no more weight than blind faith -- undermines a key principle of a civil society: that we owe our fellow citizens explanations for what we do. Reason matters -- not just for the noble ideal of truth, but for the everyday world in which we live.

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CHOICE Review

In order to settle a dispute, one needs to settle the facts; to do this, one needs to settle how facts are to be known. But settling how facts are to be known is no easy task. Some would nominate reason as the most reliable guide, but how is one to justify this choice? Appealing to reason would only beg the question. To skirt this skeptical challenge, Lynch (Univ. of Connecticut) advances a pragmatic defense of reason, arguing that a set of shared epistemic principles is indispensable to civil society. To this end, he sets up a thought experiment in which agents are invited to select principles from behind a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance." Beginning in such an "epistemic original position," one's best bet would be to privilege principles that are "open" and can be appreciated from a "common point of view." And this, according to Lynch, is precisely why one should privilege the principles of science, with its practices that are repeatable, intersubjective, and transparent. Readers must decide whether Lynch's argument is compelling. Indisputable, however, is its novelty. Ultimately, Lynch may well be right: his may be the best, if not the only answer to the skeptic's challenge. Summing Up: Recommended. Lower-division undergraduates through faculty/researchers. F. A. Grabowski Rogers State University